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Test of Sovereign Immunity for Municipal
Corporations
Howard H. Fairweather*
N A RECENT OHIO CASE, the Supreme Court handed down a
unanimous opinion that a municipality that voluntarily owns
and operates a swimming pool primarily for the benefit of its
citizens (who might be interested), does so in the exercise of a
proprietary function and is answerable for its negligence.1 In
his opinion, Judge Guernsey cited the customary tests to be ap-
plied in such cases of distinguishing between a governmental and
proprietary function: "Was it a duty imposed upon the mu-
nicipality as an obligation of sovereignty, or was it an action
taken for the comfort and convenience of its citizens?" 2 and,
"Was the act for the common good of all people in the state, or
whether it relates to special corporate benefit or profit?" 3 But
while all the judges concurred in the decision, two of them,4 in
a concurring opinion, deeply questioned the basis on which this
case, and indeed many others involving the distinction between
a governmental and proprietary function, was decided. In his
opinion, Judge Gibson states:
While the rule that a municipality is liable when acting in
its proprietary capacity but is immune from liability when
acting in its governmental capacity may be stated simply
enough, the application of the "simple rule" has caused much
difficulty, and in fact the law in this area is a tangle of dis-
agreement and confusion. Thus the basic question is whether
the purported distinction should be continued.5
Such sentiments are not new in Ohio. Both the courts and
legal writers have long recognized the problem of distinguishing
between governmental and proprietary functions., And as it ap-
* A.B., Harvard College; M.B.A., Amos Tuck School of Bus. Admin.; Com-
mercial Banking Dept. of Central National Bank, Cleveland; Second-Year
Student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
I Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 NE 2d 857 (1963).
2 City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 NE 210 (1927).
3 Ibid.
4 J. J. Matthias and O'Neill.
5 Supra, n. 1 at 391.
6 An early statement by the Supreme Court bears testimony to the problem:
"Undoubtedly there is difficulty, sometimes, in determining the class in
(Continued on next page)
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pears that the distinction will be with the courts for at least
some time to come, the real problem is to re-examine the tests to
see if a workable solution can be obtained.
At the conclusion of his opinion in the Hack case, Judge Gib-
son attached a compilation of Ohio cases which exemplify the
inconsistencies and changes in the court's position in decisions on
governmental immunity. As this compilation deserves wider
publication, it is attached in tabular form as an appendix to this
article. But rather than treat lightly a large number of cases,
two problem areas were chosen which are especially symptomatic
of the difficulty in applying the established tests as to whether
a function is governmental or proprietary. The areas to be ex-
amined are (1) collection of garbage, and (2) sewage. In neither
area can it be easily seen whether the function is proprietary or
governmental. Thus both offer fertile areas of examination.
In Broughton v. City of Cleveland" the Ohio Supreme Court
decided that:
A municipal corporation, when engaged in the health-pre-
serving service of collecting garbage for its inhabitants, is in
the exercise of a police power and is performing a govern-
mental function . . .8
This overruled the decision handed down in Russo v. City
of Cleveland,9 which had stated that garbage collection by a mu-
nicipality is not a governmental function. An examination of the
tests applied by the two courts does little to reconcile the incon-
sistency between the two decisions, as both argue in the same
terms. In the Broughton case, the court refers back to the tests
of sovereignty outlined in Wooster v. Arbenz,1 and comes to the
conclusion that, in addition to being "an act for the common good
(Continued from preceding page)
which a particular case must fall; and it is also true that there is consider-
able conflict in the authorities as to the extent of such liability." Robinson v.
Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625, 51 Am. Rpt. 857 (1885). See also similar state-
ments by the courts in Frederick v. City of Columbus, 58 Ohio St. 538, 549,
51 NE 35 (1898); Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 169, 126 NE
72 (1919); Eversole v. City of Columbus, 169 Ohio St. 205, 207, 158 NE 2d
515 (1959). For articles in this area see: Maier, Sovereign Immunity: Will
Ohio Follow Michigan's Lead?, 31 U. Cinc. L. R. 327 (1962); Hunter, Local
Government Tort Liability, 9 Ohio St. L. J. 377 (1948).
7 167 Ohio St. 29, 146 NE 2d 301 (1957).
8 Ibid.
9 28 Ohio C. A. 25 (1917), affd. in memo. op. 98 Ohio St. 465, 121 NE 901
(1918).
10 Supra, n. 3.
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of all the people in the state," the collection of garbage is a func-
tion of sovereignty and a valid exercise of police power in that it
provides for the protection and preservation of public health.
In the Russo case, the court argues in much the same terms when
it states, "The people of this state at large have no interest in the
disposal of garbage in Cleveland," and "Nothing could concretely
be more at variance with one's natural notions as to the office
and dignity of sovereignty than the gathering of garbage as it
is commonly done on the streets."
Clearly, the change of position is not due to any new break-
through in legal reasoning in this area, but rather to an appli-
cation of tests which are imprecise and susceptible to varying
answers, given the changes in the social climate in which the
courts sit. While it is reasonable that fifty years ago the notion
of sovereignty would not have included garbage collection, today
the opposite notion is accepted. As we have progressed in terms
of social responsibility, municipal activity has penetrated into
areas undreamed of a generation ago. Off-street municipal
garages, public rapid transit, free distribution of anti-polio vac-
cines, and municipal power facilities, are but a few areas of pub-
lic activity. This social transition, and court decisions growing
from them, can be seen clearly by an examination of decisions
relating to garbage collection in the interim period between the
Russo case (1917) and the Broughton case (1957).
In Gorman v. City of Cleveland," decided in 1927, the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County noted the dangers inherent in
not providing for the collection and disposal of refuse, and dis-
coursed at some length as to the consequences of neglect. The
court was admittedly aware of the Russo decision, but attempted
to distinguish that case by maintaining that the question of
preservation of health and protection from contagion, "did not
appear there as predominant issues, determining the difference
between a governmental and a proprietary function." 12
Eleven years later, the Court of Appeals for Sandusky
County decided, in Imes v. City of Fremont,13 that collection
of garbage is a governmental function and supported its con-
tention in the face of the Russo decision by stating, "the marked
tendency is to regard all municipal measures looking to better
11 26 Ohio App. 109, 159 NE 136 (1927).
12 Ibid. at 117.
l 58 Ohio App. 335, 16 NE 2d 584 (1938).
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health and sanitation in the community, as public and govern-
mental functions." By marshalling Ohio citations to bolster its
argument,14 the court finally concluded:
From all this authority, it appears that if the Supreme Court
did intend by its memorandum in City of Cleveland vs.
Russo to hold the garbage service to be a proprietary func-
tion, it has impliedly overruled such pronouncement, and it
can be safely assumed that a municipality is performing a
public service in collection and disposal of garbage.
15
That the Court of Appeals for Sandusky County had cor-
rectly gauged the temper of the times can be seen with reference
to the Broughton case. But ascertaining the social con-
science and rendering decisions accordingly (in the face of a
clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court to the contrary) is
a questionable function for the courts to adopt. There is nothing
more difficult to measure objectively than the general will (if
indeed there be a "general will"), and nothing more difficult to
gauge than the social conscience. For indeed, such decisions
more accurately reflect the subjective will and the social con-
science of the court rather than the people, and create incon-
sistencies in the law as the court changes. 16 Unfortunately, a
test as to whether a municipal function is governmental or
proprietary, based on a determination whether the function is
"an obligation of sovereignty" or "an action taken for the com-
fort and convenience of citizens," is at best transitory, and is
based upon the court's notions as to the proper extent of gov-
ernmental activity.
14 The cases cited include: State ex rel. Moock v. City of Cincinnati, 120
Ohio St. 500, 166 NE 583 (1929), in which paragraph one of the syllabus
reads, "The adoption of regulations pertaining to health and sanitation in-
cluding the process of collection of garbage is within the proper exercise of
the police powers of the State and its municipalities"; Hutchinson v. City of
Lakewood, 125 Ohio St. 100, 180 NE 643 (1932); and the Supreme Court's
overruling of a motion to certify the record in Gorman v. City of Cleveland,
supra n. 11.
15 Supra, n. 13 at 337.
16 A good example of how changes in the bench caused rapid changes in
rulings as to the governmental or proprietary nature of a municipal func-
tion can be seen from an examination of a set of cases dealing with the
status of fire department activities, decided between 1898 and 1922. The
decisions rendered in Frederick v. City of Columbus, 58 Ohio St. 538, 51 NE
35 (1898); Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 NE 72 (1919);
Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 NE 164 (1922), tend to
show that when decisions are based not on the rule of law but rather on
the subjective ideas of what the court believes is in accordance with the
"general will," inconsistencies and embarrassing changes of position will
occur with the changes on the bench.
Jan., 1964
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Whereas the courts seem to have finally arrived at some
unanimity in cases involving collection and disposal of garbage,
they are still unclear as to the status of sewage disposal, an area
which is in many ways analogous to the former. While it would,
at first glance, seem that cases pertaining to collection of garbage
and sewage disposal would be decided in much the same way, as
both areas are involved with functions that protect the health
and well-being of the populace, an examination of the decisions
in this latter area show that the courts are not yet ready to fully
declare sewage disposal to be a governmental function. It seems
that the courts will not "fully" declare it a governmental func-
tion because it appears that they have decided that while the
maintenance of a sewage disposal plant is not a governmental
function,17 activities taken for its construction are.1s This ju-
dicial hairsplitting has further clouded the issue and appears to
have little reasonable basis.
The rationalization behind the holding that collection of
garbage is a governmental function, while the maintenance of a
sewage system is a proprietary function, appears to have escaped
some of the members of the Ohio Supreme Court, as well as
the writer. In Broughton v. City of Cleveland,19 Judges Taft
and Bell, in the dissenting opinion as to the governmental nature
of garbage collection, state:
In my opinion, the accumulation within a municipality of
those wastes that sewers are designed to handle would be
more deleterious to public health and safety than would
accumulation of garbage therein; and the collection and dis-
posal of sewage by the municipality should constitute as
valid an exercise of the police power and represent as much
a governmental function for safeguarding public health as
does the collection of garbage by the municipality.
Hence, it seems to me that, if we are to be consistent with
our decision with respect to that operation, maintenance and
repair of sewers, we should reverse the decision of the ap-
pellate court.20 (That is, hold collection of garbage a pro-
prietary function.)
17 Portsmouth v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 113 Ohio St. 250, 148 NE 846 (1925);
Salem v. Harding, 121 Ohio St. 412, 169 NE 457 (1929); Dowd v. Cincinnati,
152 Ohio St. 132, 87 NE 2d 243 (1949).
18 Hutchinson v. Lakewood, 125 Ohio St. 100, 180 NE 643 (1932); State ex
rel. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 79 NE 2d 127 (1948).
19 Supra, n. 7.
20 Ibid. at 35.
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An examination of the cases which deal with holding that
the maintenance of sewage systems is a proprietary function is,
unfortunately, not revealing as to why the court so decided. In
City of Portsmouth v. Mitchell Manufacturing Co.,2 1 a case which
appears to be one of the first in Ohio as to the governmental or
proprietary nature of a sewage system, the Supreme Court held
that, "construction and institution of a sewer system is a gov-
ernmental matter, while the obligation to maintain and repair is
purely ministerial." The decision was entirely based on the
weight of authority in other jurisdictions. This decision was fol-
lowed without further elucidation in City of Salem v. Harding22
in 1929, and in Doud v. City of Cincinnati23 in 1949. It would ap-
pear that the question raised by Judges Taft and Bell as to why
the collection of garbage is deemed a governmental function
while maintenance of a sewage system is proprietary, is left un-
answered in Ohio. This is but another example of the glaring
inconsistencies created by the application of a test of sovereign
immunity which gives the court no benchmark from which to
proceed.
Further inconsistencies arise in the examination of those de-
cisions which hold that the construction of a sewer system is a
governmental function. In Hutchinson v. City of Lakewood,24
the court held that, as "The preservation of the health, safety and
welfare of the dwellers in urban centers of population consti-
tutes a part of the police power. . certainly the power to con-
struct public sewers constitutes a part of the police power for
such sewers are established for the express purpose of pre-
serving the public health. This being the case, the function is
purely governmental . . ."
Although the construction of a sewage system is deemed
governmental as an exercise of the police power of the munici-
pality, it does not appear reasonable to deem that the main-
tenance and repair of the same system, which is necessary to in-
sure the continued health and welfare of the population, is a
proprietary function. Rather, it appears that this inconsistency
is merely an illogical outgrowth of the continuing application of
the tests of sovereign immunity which are imprecise and too
susceptible to varying, if not opposite, judicial interpretations.
21 113 Ohio St. 250, 148 NE 840 (1925).
22 121 Ohio St. 412, 169 NE 457 (1929).
23 152 Ohio St. 132, 87 NE 2d 243 (1949).
24 125 Ohio St. 100, 180 NE 643 (1939).
Jan., 1964
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Some Possible Guidelines
The remainder of this article will be devoted to an attempt
at suggesting some possible guidelines toward a more workable
test of sovereign immunity for municipal corporations. The sug-
gested guidelines will be examined in terms of the various ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each.
I. Abolition of Governmental Immunity
While this solution has been suggested and examined pre-
viously in some detail, 25 its simplicity of application commends
its mention. Rather than the court attempting to distinguish be-
tween a governmental and proprietary function in order to de-
termine whether or not to throw up the shield of governmental
immunity in front of the municipality, it could instead concern
itself solely with determining liability. At one stroke the in-
consistency and confusion would be swept aside. Needless to
say, this is not a new solution; it has been proposed with some
regularity by various members of the Ohio Supreme Court,
notably in Judge Wanamaker's concurring opinion in Fowler v.
City of Cleveland,26 noted above. As the role of municipal gov-
ernment expands to the point where every member of the public
is in frequent contact with it, it is often unjust to deny compen-
sation because of the rule of governmental immunity for injury
to that segment of the public which has been negligently in-
jured by an agent of the municipality.
Unfortunately, in the converse of this situation lies the dif-
ficulty in abolishing the rule. As municipal activities expand, so,
too, does its exposure to liability. Without the protective mantle
of governmental immunity for some of its activities, a small mu-
nicipality might be bankrupted by several sizeable judgments
against it. Rather than the public at large being protected, it
could be ruined.
II. A Definitive List of Proprietary and Governmental Functions
Another possible solution is to request the Attorney General
to draw up a definitive list that would distinguish municipal
functions as to their governmental or proprietary nature. As
25 For a comprehensive examination of this solution, see Maier, Sovereign
Immunity: Will Ohio Follow Michigan's Lead?, 31 U. Cinc. L. R. 307 (1962).
26 Supra, n. 15.
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the activities of the municipalities expand, the list could be
brought up to date by regular and periodic additions. Since
the opinions of the Attorney General are persuasive rather than
mandatory, the courts would neither be bound by an iron-clad
ruling, nor be left without any benchmark from which to arrive
at consistent decisions.
The major problem with this solution is that of inability to
to foresee all of the possible future areas of litigation. A defin-
itive list can only categorize those municipal activities which
already have been experienced. It would be impossible to specu-
late as to the areas into which municipal governments will move
in the next decade. Eventually a case will arise which calls for
a distinction which has not been classified and is not analogous
to any that have been. Thus, the court will be forced back to
the application of some general rule.
III. A Test Embodying the Distinction Between the "Mandatory
Functions" and the "Enumerated Powers" of a Municipality
Another, and perhaps most workable, solution to the prob-
lem might be to view as a governmental function only those ac-
tivities which are of a mandatory nature as provided by the Ohio
Revised Code. Conversely, those activities which are simply enu-
merated as general powers of the municipality would be classed
as proprietary functions. This solution has two points in its
favor: (1) the Revised Code is relatively clear in its language
as to which activities are mandatory in character and which are
simply enumerated as general powers, and (2) such a test has
precedent in Ohio case law.
As to the first point, Title 7 on Municipal Corporations seems
to distinguish between those functions which are mandatory
("The municipality shall. . ."), and those which are enumerated
as general powers ("The municipality may . . ."). For example,
R. C. 737.05 and R. C. 737.08 clearly make it a duty of the mu-
nicipal corporation to maintain a police and fire department, re-
spectively. Similarly, R. C. 723.01 gives the municipality the
power to regulate the use of the streets, and specifically charges
it with the duty to keep them open: "The municipality . .. shall
have the care, supervision and control of public highways . ..
and shall cause them to be kept open, in repair and free from
nuisance." Conversely, R. C. 717.01, which enumerates the
various special powers of municipal corporations, does not make
Jan., 1964
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these activities mandatory but merely permits their existence.
Those functions which the municipalities are bound by stat-
ute to perform would be classed as governmental; those func-
tions which the municipality may, at its discretion, wish to per-
form would be classed as proprietary. However, an obvious
problem immediately arises: if those activities which are de-
fined as a duty of the municipality are given the cloak of gov-
ernmental immunity, does this not except the municipality from
liability for failure to perform its duty? This problem can be
dealt with by granting to the municipality governmental im-
munity from tort liability only in the active performance of its
duty. It would not be immune from liability in those situations
where the court finds that failure to perform the duty was the
proximate cause of the injury. Thus, the municipality's failure
to act in the face of a duty rather than its efforts toward per-
forming that duty would be the basis for liability. In this man-
ner, the municipality would be afforded some measure of pro-
tection while not being given the opportunity to entirely hide
behind the shield of governmental immunity. And perhaps most
important, the distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions will be given a solid base.
As to the second point, that this proposed test has some
precedent in Ohio case law can be seen by an examination of
the original test pronounced in Wooster v. Arbenz.27 By basing
the test of a governmental function on whether or not it is a
mandatory duty as set forth in the Revised Code, this parallels
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Wooster case when
it cited as the test, "whether or not the function is a duty im-
posed on the state as an obligation of sovereignty." The major
difference in the proposed test as compared with that pronounced
by the Supreme Court in 1927 is that the former gives reference
to a definitive source as to whether or not the function in ques-
tion is a mandatory duty, while the latter leaves it up to the
courts to decide whether it is a duty imposed as an obligation of
sovereignty.
Further, the proposed test again parallels the old test in its
definition as to a proprietary function. In the above 1927 de-
cision, the court held that if it "was an action for the comfort
and convenience of its citizens" then it was proprietary. The
27 Supra, n. 2.
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proposed test defines those activities which, under the Revised
Code, the municipality is permitted (but not charged) to per-
form as proprietary. Again, the benefit of the proposed test is
that the statute is the guide.
Needless to say, this last possible guideline has its weak-
nesses. For example, under R. C. 755.01, it appears that it is a
mandatory duty that a park board be established if five per cent
of the qualified electors petition for an election, and if the elec-
torate votes accordingly. But while the establishment of the park
board may become mandatory, there is no duty to establish parks,
playgrounds, pools, and other recreation areas. Such activities
are merely permitted to the municipality. While it is clear that
selection of a park board is a mandatory duty, should it not be
distinguished from those duties which provide for police or fire
departments and which are not conditioned upon the vote of
the electorate? Problems such as this will arise under any test
established. However, under the proposed test, the courts would
have some definitive guidelines as to the correct decision.
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Appendix
The following is a list of reported Ohio cases which clearly
demonstrate the morass of inconsistencies and changes of mind
which have occurred as a result of the application of Ohio's
"simple rule."
GOVERNMENTAL
Construction of sewer
City of Salem v. Harding (1929),
121 Ohio St., 412
Hutchinson v. City of Lakewood
(1932), 125 Ohio St., 100
Creation and maintenance of
police department
Aldrich v. City of Youngstown
(1922), 106 Ohio St,, 342
Fire department
Fredrick, Admx.; v. City of Columbus
(1898), 58 Ohio St., 538
Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati
(1896), 19 Ohio St., 19
Operation of hospital
Lloyd v. City of Toledo (1931),
42 Ohio App., 36
Collecting garbage
Broughton v. City of Cleveland
(1957), 167 Ohio St., 29
Maintenance of sanitary land fill for
disposal of garbage and refuse
Osborn v. City of Akron (1960),
171 Ohio St., 361
Construction of sewage plant
Ratliff v. Akron (1959),
82 Ohio Law Abs., 353
Collecting rubbish
Gorman v. City of Cleveland (1927),
26 Ohio App., 109
Bademan v. Cleveland (1952),
66 Ohio Law Abs., 175
Construction and maintenance of
park and swimming pool
Selden v. City of Cuyahoga Falls
(1937), 132 Ohio St., 223
Maintenance of public park in
natural state
City of Cleveland v. Walker, Admx.
(1936), 52 Ohio App., 477
Maintenance and control of
combined park and zoo
Crusafi v. City of Cleveland
(1959), 169 Ohio St., 137
PROPRIETARY
Operation and upkeep of sewer
City of Portsmouth v. Mitchell Mfg.
Co. (1925), 113 Ohio St., 250
Airport
Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cin-
cinnati (1960), 173 Ohio St., 345
Fire department
Fowler v. Cleveland (1919), 100
Ohio St., 158
Operation of hospital
Hyde v. City of Lakewood (1961),
17 Ohio Op. (2d), 61
Collecting garbage
City of Cleveland v. Russo, Admr.
(1918), 98 Ohio St., 465
Operation of transportation system
Zangerle, Aud., v. City of Cleveland
(1945), 145 Ohio St., 347
Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Village of
North Olmsted (1935), 130 Ohio St.,
144
Construction and maintenance of
water system
City of Barberton v. Miksch (1934),
128 Ohio St., 169
Cemetery
City of Toledo v. Cone (1884),
41 Ohio St., 149
Maintenance of arts and crafts
building as part of recreation
program
Eversole v. City of Columbus
(1959), 169 Ohio St., 205
Municipal auditorium
State, ex rel. White, v. City of
Cleveland (1932), 125 Ohio St., 230
Municipal stadium
Chupek, Admr., v. City of Akron
(1951), 89 Ohio App., 266
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GOVERNMENTAL
Municipal building
Tinsley v. Cincinnati (1957),
78 Ohio Law Abs., 419
Construction and maintenance
of park
Snider v. Youngstown (1938),
27 Ohio Law Abs., 231
Improvement and maintenance
of streets
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. City of
Fremont (1955), 164 Ohio St., 344
Davis v. Charles Shutrump & Sons
Co. (1942), 140 Ohio St., 89
City of Dayton v. Glaser (1907),
76 Ohio St., 471
Village of Blue Ash v. City of
Cincinnati (1960), 173 Ohio St., 345
Barricading street for coasting
City of Mingo Junction v. Sheline,
Admx. (1935), 130 Ohio St., 34
Street cleaning
City of Akron v. Butler (1923),
108 Ohio St., 122
Galluppi v. City of Youngstown
(1936), 55 Ohio App., 331
Traffic lights
Martin v. City of Canton (1931),
41 Ohio App., 420
Issuing and revoking building
permits
James v. City of Toledo (1927),
24 Ohio App., 268
Jail or workhouse
Wittenbrook, Admx., v. Columbus,
33 Ohio Law Abs., 586
Bell v. City of Cincinnati
(1909), 80 Ohio St., 1
PROPRIETARY
Renting of memorial building
Dean v. Board of Trustees of
Soldiers & Sailors Memorial Bldg.
(1940), 65 Ohio App., 362
Construction of off-street
parking facility
Zaras v. City of Findlay (1960),
112 Ohio App., 367
Operation of off-street parking
facility
Cutnaw v. City of Columbus
(1958), 107 Ohio App., 413
Municipal golf course
Gorsuch v. Springfield (1945),
43 Ohio Law Abs., 83
Wall of municipal building left
standing after fire
Lebanon v. Loop (1935),
20 Ohio Law Abs., 302
Supplying of electricity
Butler v. Karb, Mayor (1917),
96 Ohio St., 472
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Village of
Wadsworth (1924), 109 Ohio St., 440
Jan., 1964
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